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Abstract As societies are increasingly concerned with risks, it is important to eval-
uate risks not only from an individual but also from a societal perspective. Two
essential dimensions of public or social risks are the inequality concerning the dis-
tribution of risks over various groups and members of society and the level of risk
faced by individuals and by the society as a whole. This paper disentangles these two
essential dimensions and studies people’s preferences concerning different types of
allocations of risks over groups of people. We do so in a laboratory experiment with
real incentives, where subjects are placed in the role of a social planner and choose
between different types of allocations of risks over 10 other participants. The allo-
cations differ only in terms of dispersion, i.e. they differ only in terms of inequality
and risk. The majority of our subjects exhibit clear preferences over different types
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of allocations consistent with ex ante inequality and individual risk aversion, and ex
post inequality and collective risk seeking behavior. These results are consistent with
the literature on public risk and can be reconciled with responsibility aversion.
Keywords Inequality · Risk aversion · Public risk · Social risk
JEL Classifications D63 · D81
1 Introduction
Societies are increasingly concerned with public risks such as health epidemics, acts
of terrorism, and financial crises (Quiggin 2007). One reason for this increased pre-
occupation is that these risks are likely to affect many members of society at the same
time. Public risks entail not only individual risks for each member of society, but also
risks concerning the inequalities between members of society. It is therefore impor-
tant to evaluate the allocation of such risks not only from an individual, but also from
a broader societal perspective.
Two essential dimensions of public risks are the inequality concerning the distri-
bution of risks over various groups and members of society and the level of risk faced
by individuals and by the society as a whole. For policymakers who design policies
to cope with public risks, it is crucial to understand what role these two dimensions
play in people’s evaluations of such risks. This paper studies people’s preferences
concerning different types of allocations of risks over groups of people and disentan-
gles these two essential dimensions. We do so in a laboratory experiment with real
incentives.
To rule out selfish and strategic motives, we study choices between allocations
of risk that cannot affect the payoffs or risks faced by the decision maker himself.
Thus, we consider decision makers who can be viewed as social planners, or impartial
spectators (Smith 1759). As Konow (2009) states, studying preferences of impartial
spectators is particularly relevant for social choice theory, welfare analysis, and pub-
lic policy, as such preferences are characterized by unbiasedness. The perspective of
an impartial spectator is also relevant in other situations where people make deci-
sions on behalf of others. One can think of parents deciding on behalf of their kids,
medical doctors deciding on behalf of their patients, or managers deciding on behalf
of their employees.
This study is complementary to the studies on interactions between social pref-
erences and risks where the decision maker is affected by his decisions. Examples
of such studies are the ones analyzing peer effects on risk taking and risk shar-
ing (Rohde and Rohde 2011; Linde and Sonnemans 2012; Lahno and Serra-Garcia
2015; Cettolin and Tausch 2015) and the ones on risky dictator games (e.g. Brock
et al. 2013; Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010) and strategic games like in Bolton et al.
(2005). The decision situations we consider can be viewed as a special class of risky
dictator games with 11 players where the decision maker can choose between two
distributions of risks that do not differ in his own payoff. Several other experimen-
tal studies with real incentives took a similar approach in riskfree settings in order to
J Risk Uncertain (2015) 51:103–124 105
focus on pure distributional preferences and to exclude selfish and strategic concerns
(Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Cappelen et al. 2013).
When evaluating allocations of risk across society, two notions of inequality are
critical (Diamond 1967; Harsanyi 1955): ex-ante inequality, which concerns the pro-
cedure that generates the allocations, and ex-post inequality, which concerns the
eventual allocation of outcomes (Fleurbaey 2010; Sarin 1985; Trautmann 2009). The
literature on public risk (Fishburn and Sarin 1991; Keeney 1980a, b; Keeney and
Winkler 1985; Sarin 1985; Gajdos et al. 2010) indicates that, next to inequalities and
individual risks, the possible aggregate payoffs of the group or society also play a
role in decisions to allocate risks over society. Therefore, we consider two levels of
risk: individual risk and collective risk. Individual risk refers to the dispersion of the
possible outcomes for one individual, irrespective of the outcomes of others. Col-
lective risk refers to the dispersion of the total sum of outcomes. We will consider
allocations of risk which differ only in terms of these inequalities and risks.
The relevance and implications of our four inequality and risk concepts can be
illustrated with the following example. Consider a group of individuals and the fol-
lowing two possible allocations of risk. In allocation A each individual receives an
independent lottery yielding e20 with 50% probability and nothing otherwise. In
allocation B 50% of the individuals receive e20 and the others nothing, where the
50% fortunate ones are predetermined by a certain characteristic of the individuals,
such as age. Which allocation would be considered to be socially superior? Should
we give everyone an equal opportunity or should we favor particular groups in soci-
ety? Allocation A, which is in line with the notion of equality of opportunity, could
be regarded as superior as all individuals face equal chances. From the perspective
of solidarity, though, one might argue that it is favorable to support the weakest in
society such as children and the elderly, which will lead to predetermined alloca-
tions, as is the case in allocation B. This conflict between equality of opportunity
and solidarity is present in many real life situations such as the allocation of donor
organs, student placement procedures, the allocation of power plants, and the design
of rescue plans in case of calamities.
Now suppose that allocation B is replaced by allocation C, where with a 50%
probability all individuals receive e20 and otherwise all individuals receive noth-
ing. This allocation C guarantees that everyone receives the same outcome but does
not take away the uncertainty whether this outcome will be high or not. Whether
or not a person finds allocations A and C different from each other depends partly
on the order in which he processes risks and inequalities. A person who first pro-
cesses risk and then inequality may argue that in both allocation procedures all
individuals get the same lottery and thereby have the same chances, i.e. equal
opportunities, so that there is no inequality. This person will find both procedures
equivalent. A person who first processes inequalities and then risk may argue that
in allocation C there will always be equality after resolution of the uncertainty,
whereas in allocation A it is very likely that there will be inequality after resolu-
tion of uncertainty. This person will not find the two procedures equivalent. Thus,
the order in which the two types of dispersion, inequality and risk, are processed
affects preferences and, thereby, also sheds light on people’s concerns for procedural
fairness.
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The aim of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to analyze people’s preferences
over allocations of risks over groups of people. The second aim is to disentangle these
preferences into concerns for risk and inequality. During the experiment, subjects are
placed in the role of a social planner and choose between different types of allocations
of risks over 10 other participants. The allocations differ only in terms of dispersion,
i.e. they differ only in terms of inequality and risk. If subjects care only about the
expected payoffs of individuals and the expected aggregate payoff in the group, they
will be indifferent between these allocations. Yet, if they also care about risk and
inequality, they will not be indifferent.
Though many studies have analyzed people’s concerns for risk, and many have
analyzed people’s concerns for inequality, only very few have studied how concerns
for risk and inequality are integrated (Bolton et al. 2005; Kroll and Davidovitz 2003;
Keller and Sarin 1988; Bian and Keller 1999; Loomes 1982). This paper is the first to
experimentally, and by using real incentives, analyze people’s preferences over pub-
lic risks which affect other people. Our experiment is inspired by a previous study
(Rohde and Rohde 2011) which found that subjects had a strong preference for an
allocation rule which gave every individual the same independent risk, while subjects
were reluctant to implement allocation rules which favored a randomly selected, pre-
determined number of individuals. The experiment in the current paper was designed
to provide insights into the reasons for this preference.
The results of our experiment are striking. We observe a clear pattern in individ-
uals’ preferences over different allocation procedures. Subjects are not indifferent
between these procedures and take risks and inequalities into account. In particu-
lar, our subjects cannot be viewed as social planners who maximize utilitarian social
welfare functions of selfish individual expected utilities. Moreover, we find that our
subjects are averse towards ex ante inequality and individual risk, while they seek ex
post inequality and collective risk. Though surprising at first sight, we will show that
these results do not contradict the existing literature.
2 Public risk: Inequality and risk
The types of risk allocations we consider in this paper differ in terms of ex ante
inequality, ex post inequality, individual risk, and collective risk. While these con-
cepts are different, they are closely related. Before giving exact definitions, we will
consider two examples that clearly illustrate the differences and similarities between
the inequality and risk concepts. The first example is from Diamond (1967). Con-
sider two people: Ann and Bob. We flip a coin to determine their utility allocations.
In the first procedure (Procedure I) Ann will get one unit of utility and Bob zero, irre-
spective of the outcome of the coin flip. In the second procedure (Procedure II) Ann
gets one unit of utility, and Bob zero, in case of Heads, and the utilities are reversed
in case of Tails. Table 1 summarizes these utility levels.
A social planner merely concerned about ex post inequality would argue that in
both procedures one person would end up with one unit of utility and the other with
zero units of utility, irrespective of the outcome of the coin flip. Thus, he would
be indifferent between both procedures. A social planner who was concerned about
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Table 1 Example
Procedure I Procedure II Procedure III
Heads Tails Heads Tails H-H H-T T-H T-T
Ann 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Bob 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
ex ante inequality would argue that in Procedure I there is inequality in terms of
expected utilities,1 whereas in Procedure II there is no such inequality. He would
then favor Procedure II. This illustrates the difference between ex ante and ex post
inequality.
In both Procedures I and II the total utility is always one unit. Both procedures,
therefore, impose zero collective risk. Yet they do differ in terms of individual risk
in the sense that Procedure I generates no individual risk, i.e. risk from the perspec-
tive of a single individual other than the social planner, whereas Procedure II does. If
the social planner were individual risk seeking, then he would favor Procedure II in
terms of individual risk, which together with ex ante inequality aversion would make
him choose Procedure II, as ex post inequality and collective risk are the same in both
procedures. If, however, he were individual risk averse, then he would favor Proce-
dure I in terms of individual risk, while he favors Procedure II in terms of ex ante
inequality, making it impossible for us to predict what he will choose. This example
shows that it is sometimes impossible to disentangle attitudes towards individual risk
and ex ante inequality.
To illustrate the difference between individual and collective risk and their relation
to ex ante and ex post inequality, let’s consider a third procedure: Procedure III. This
procedure differs from the other two in the sense that the utilities of Ann and Bob
will be determined independently of each other. More precisely, the coin will be
flipped twice: once for Ann and once for Bob. Heads yields a utility level of one and
Tails zero. The payoffs are given in Table 1. The social planner is asked to choose
between Procedures II and III. Note that the individual risk in both procedures is
the same: one unit of utility with 50% probability and zero otherwise. Thus, a social
planner merely concerned about individual risk would be indifferent between the two
procedures. In terms of total payoff, though, Procedure III is riskier. Thus, Procedure
III generates more collective risk. A collective risk averse social planner would then
favor Procedure II.
Procedures II and III do not differ in terms of ex ante inequality as both procedures
yield the same expected utilities.2 Yet they do differ in terms of ex post inequality.
Unlike Procedure II, Procedure III offers a 50% probability of zero inequality ex post.
If the social planner were ex post inequality seeking, then he would favor Procedure
1A similar reasoning holds under other models of individual decision making, like, for instance, prospect
theory, as long as monotonicity holds.
2A similar reasoning holds under other models of individual decision making, like, for instance, prospect
theory, as long as monotonicity holds.
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II, in line with collective risk aversion. If, instead, he were ex post inequality averse,
then he would favor Procedure III, which would counteract collective risk aversion.
Thus, it is sometimes impossible to disentangle attitudes towards collective risk and
ex post inequality.
These examples contain two messages. First, they show the distinction between
the two inequality concepts and between the two risk concepts. Second, they show
that while inequality and risk are different, they are not completely independent
from each other. Our experiment will allow us to disentangle attitudes towards risk
and inequality by considering choices that circumvent the interdependence between
the four concepts. Before presenting the experimental design in Sections 3 and 4,
the rest of this section will give exact definitions of the risks and inequalities we
will consider.
We consider a setting with n + 1 individuals 0, . . . , n. Individual 0 is the social
planner whose preferences we are interested in. The social planner chooses between
allocations of risk for the n other players. His own payoff is unaffected by his deci-
sions. Our setting thereby resembles a public risk setting (Keeney 1980a, b) with
the crucial difference being that the outcomes we consider are continuous monetary
payoffs instead of binary outcomes such as life or death.
Inequality and risk are dispersions of outcomes over individuals and states of
nature. We will operationalize the inequality and risk concepts by measuring the cor-
responding dispersions through standard deviations. The non-parametric results of
this paper are unaffected by this choice of measure for dispersion: different measures
could be used as long as the ordering of the allocations in the experiment according
to each individual risk or inequality concept would be unaffected. The parametric
results could, in theory, be affected by the particular choice for dispersion-measure.
Yet, using other commonly used measures for inequality such as the Gini index and
the Theil index did not affect the parametric results qualitatively, except for the sig-
nificance level of gender effects and of ex ante inequality aversion. Therefore, we
only report the results based on standard deviations in the main text and report the
Gini and Theil results in Online Appendix A.
An ex post allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) yields outcome xi ∈ R to individual i
and thereby specifies a payoff to all individuals except for the decision maker whose
payoff is always unaffected. An ex ante allocation L = (p1 : x1, . . . , pm : xm) for
any finite m yields ex post allocation xj with probability pj for j = 1, . . . , m. An ex
post allocation is an allocation that results after risk is resolved. An ex ante allocation
is a lottery of ex post allocations and thereby describes the probabilities that particular
ex post allocations may result. By xi,j we denote the outcome for individual i in ex
post allocation xj .
The individual expected value of individual i in ex ante allocation L = (p1 :
x1, . . . , pm : xm) is defined by IEVi(L) = ∑mj=1 pjxi,j . The average expected
value of ex ante allocation L is then given by IEV (L) = ∑ni=1 1nIEVi(L). We
define ex ante inequality as the standard deviation of the distribution of individual
expected values: EAI (L) =
√
∑n
i=1 1n
(
IEVi(L) − IEV (L)
)2
. A decision maker
who is merely concerned about ex ante inequality behaves as if he first processes the
risk dimension (IEV) and then the interpersonal dimension of an ex ante allocation.
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The ex post average payoff of ex post allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is given by
x¯ = ∑ni=1 1nxi . The ex post inequality of ex post allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is the standard deviation of the ex post distribution and is given by EPI (x) =√∑n
i=1 1n (xi − x¯)2. The expected ex post inequality of ex ante allocation L = (p1 :
x1, . . . , pm : xm) is given by EEPI (x) = ∑mj=1
(
pjEPI (xj )
)
. A decision maker
who is merely concerned about expected ex post inequality behaves as if he first pro-
cesses the interpersonal dimension (EPI) and then the risk dimension of an ex ante
allocation.
In line with the literature on public risk, we also consider two types of risk: indi-
vidual risk and collective risk. The individual risk of individual i in ex ante allocation
L = (p1 : x1, . . . , pm : xm) is defined by IRi(L) =
√∑m
j=1 pj
(
xi,j − IEVi(L)
)2
.
We define collective risk as the standard deviation of the total payoff that accrues
to the group of individuals 1, . . . n. The collective expected value of ex ante alloca-
tion L = (p1 : x1, . . . , pm : xm) is defined by CEV (L) = ∑mj=1 pj
(∑n
i=1 xi,j
)
.
The collective risk of ex ante allocation L = (p1 : x1, . . . , pm : xm) is defined by
CR(L) =
√∑m
j=1 pj
((∑n
i=1 xi,j
) − CEV (L))2.
We will say that the social planner is ex ante inequality averse (seeking) if he
strictly prefers ex ante allocations with lower (higher) ex ante inequality, everything
else held constant. We will say that he is ex ante inequality neutral if ex ante inequal-
ity does not play any role in his preferences. Aversion, neutrality, and seeking are
defined in a similar way for expected ex post inequality, individual risk, and collective
risk.
3 Allocation types
In our experiment subjects make pairwise choices between different types of risk
allocations, which allows us to disentangle attitudes towards risks and inequalities.
We let n equal 10 so that there are 11 participants per session (10 + the decision
maker). Let (50% : 10, 50% : 5) denote a Basic Lottery that yields e10 with 50%
probability and e5 otherwise. From such a basic lottery we derive five allocation
types. To enhance readability, the phrases ‘all individuals’ and ‘all subjects’ will from
now on refer to all individuals except the decision maker. The different allocation
types are as follows:
• Independent Lottery (50% : 10, 50% : 5)
All individuals independently receive the lottery (50% : 10, 50% : 5), i.e. this
lottery is resolved 10 times.
• Common Lottery (50% : 10, 50% : 5)
The lottery (50% : 10, 50% : 5) is resolved once and all 10 individuals receive
the same outcome of the lottery.
• Random Distribution (5:10, 5:5)
Half (50%) of the 10 individuals are randomly selected and receive e10 while
the others receive e5. All individuals have equal probability of being selected to
receive the larger outcome.
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• IDbased Distribution (5:10, 5:5)
Half (50%) of the 10 individuals are selected based on their identity (details
follow in Section 4) and receive e10 while the others receive e5.
• Common Outcome (10 : 7.5)
All individuals receive e7.50.
If all 10 individuals affected by the choices have self-regarding preferences in the
sense that they derive utility only from their own payoffs and probabilities, then they
are indifferent between all allocation types except the common outcome. A social
planner with a utilitarian welfare function would then also be indifferent between
these allocation types. Our experiment allows us to test for this. Deviations from
indifference will suggest that the social planners are not using a utilitarian welfare
function with individual self-regarding utilities as input.
Table 2a summarizes the five allocation types in terms of the degrees of risks and
inequalities as defined in the previous section. Pairwise comparisons between these
lotteries allow us to disentangle concerns for risks and inequalities. Consider, for
instance, the choice between a Random Distribution and the corresponding IDbased
Distribution. These allocations differ in only one respect: in the Random Distribu-
tion the social planner does not know up front who will receive which outcome,
Table 2 Values of the inequality and risk measures for each of the allocation types
Inequality Risk
Ex ante Expected ex post Individual Collective
(a) Basic Lottery (50%:10, 50%:5)
Independent Lottery 0 2.36 2.50 7.91
Common Lottery 0 0 2.50 25.00
Common Outcome 0 0 0 0
Random Distribution 0 2.50 2.50 0
IDbased Distribution 2.50 2.50 2.50 0
(b) Basic lottery (20%:11.5, 80%:6.5)
Independent Lottery 0 1.77 2.00 6.32
Common Lottery 0 0 2.00 20.00
Common Outcome 0 0 0 0
Random Distribution 0 2.00 2.00 0
IDbased Distribution 2.00 2.00 2.00 0
(c) Basic Lottery (30%:4, 70%:9)
Independent Lottery 0 2.12 2.29 7.25
Common Lottery 0 0 2.29 22.91
Common Outcome 0 0 0 0
Random Distribution 0 2.29 2.29 0
IDbased Distribution 2.29 2.29 2.29 0
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while in the IDbased Distribution the social planner does. Thus, the IDbased Dis-
tribution imposes a larger ex ante inequality than the Random Distribution, but the
same expected ex post inequality and risks. A preference between these allocations
therefore directly reveals the attitude towards ex ante inequality.
The Random Distribution differs from the corresponding Common Lottery in
two respects: the Random Distribution imposes a larger expected ex post inequality,
whereas the Common Lottery imposes a larger collective risk. Therefore, a prefer-
ence between these two allocations gives information about the attitudes towards
ex post inequality and collective risk. If, for instance, a person is collective risk
averse and prefers the Common Lottery to the Random Distribution then he must
be expected ex post inequality averse. A preference between the Random Distribu-
tion and the corresponding Independent Lottery similarly reveals attitudes towards ex
post inequality and collective risk. The Common Outcome then allows us to reveal
the attitude towards individual risk.
4 Experimental design
In the experiment we consider three basic lotteries: (50% : 10, 50% : 5), (20% : 11.5,
80% : 6.5), and (30% : 4, 70% : 9), where the outcomes are in Euros. This paper
investigates preferences of social planners. We therefore want to keep the salience
of the payoffs of the decision makers themselves as low as possible. To this end
we ensure that their payoffs don’t depend on their decisions nor on the questions
they face.3 Thus, we keep the payoffs of the decision makers and the corresponding
expected payoffs for the other 10 subjects constant throughout the experiment. We
fix this payoff at e7.5, the expected value of the basic lotteries. Therefore, prefer-
ences cannot be driven by differences in individual expected values. We also keep the
absolute difference between the highest and the lowest outcome constant throughout
the experiment (equal to e5). We do so to prevent subjects from using the heuristic
to base their decisions merely on the difference between the highest and lowest out-
comes without paying attention to the probabilities. The lotteries differ in the relative
chances of obtaining the high outcome. In lottery (20% : 11.5, 80% : 6.5) the chance
of receiving the high outcome is relatively low, whereas in lottery (30% : 4, 70% : 9)
this chance is relatively high.
For each of the three basic lotteries we derive the five different allocation types
as described in the previous section. Subjects make pairwise choices between these
allocations, resulting in 3 times 10 binary choices as summarized in Table 3. Thus,
the choices subjects make are choices between allocation types that are based on the
same basic lottery. We repeat these choices for different basic lotteries.
For each of the three basic lotteries and for each allocation type, Table 2 gives the
values of the risks and inequalities. In the IDbased Distribution subjects are selected
3Our inequality measures are based on the group of ten others, excluding the decision maker. We repeated
our analyses with inequality measures based on standard deviations including all 11 individuals, including
the decision maker. These results were similar to the ones excluding the decision maker, with the same
signs of the coefficients and same significance levels. Therefore, we do not report them.
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Table 3 Questions of the experiment
Option A Option B A B p-value
Basic Lottery (50%:10, 50%:5), Distribution (5:10, 5:5), Common Outcome (10:7.5)
1 Independent Lottery Random Distribution 78% 22% 0.000***
2 Independent Lottery IDbased Distribution 75% 25% 0.000***
3 Independent Lottery Common Lottery 60% 40% 0.177
4 Independent Lottery Common Outcome 55% 45% 0.590
5 Random Distribution IDbased Distribution 65% 35% 0.030**
6 Random Distribution Common Lottery 40% 60% 0.177
7 Random Distribution Common Outcome 35% 65% 0.030**
8 IDbased Distribution Common Lottery 35% 65% 0.030**
9 IDbased Distribution Common Outcome 35% 65% 0.030**
10 Common Lottery Common Outcome 47% 53% 0.788
Basic Lottery (20%:11.5, 80%:6.5), Distribution (2:11.5, 8:6.5), Common Outcome (10:7.5)
11 Independent Lottery Random Distribution 76% 24% 0.000***
12 Independent Lottery IDbased Distribution 84% 16% 0.000***
13 Independent Lottery Common Lottery 58% 42% 0.281
14 Independent Lottery Common Outcome 44% 56% 0.419
15 Random Distribution IDbased Distribution 76% 24% 0.000***
16 Random Distribution Common Lottery 35% 65% 0.030**
17 Random Distribution Common Outcome 38% 62% 0.105
18 IDbased Distribution Common Lottery 38% 62% 0.105
19 IDbased Distribution Common Outcome 33% 67% 0.014**
20 Common Lottery Common Outcome 51% 49% 1.000
Basic Lottery (30%:4, 70%:9), Distribution (3:4, 7:9), Common Outcome (10:7.5)
21 Independent Lottery Random Distribution 64% 36% 0.058*
22 Independent Lottery IDbased Distribution 73% 27% 0.001***
23 Independent Lottery Common Lottery 56% 44% 0.419
24 Independent Lottery Common Outcome 44% 56% 0.419
25 Random Distribution IDbased Distribution 62% 38% 0.105
26 Random Distribution Common Lottery 44% 56% 0.419
27 Random Distribution Common Outcome 36% 64% 0.058*
28 IDbased Distribution Common Lottery 36% 64% 0.058*
29 IDbased Distribution Common Outcome 36% 64% 0.058*
30 Common Lottery Common Outcome 33% 67% 0.014**
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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based on their student ID number.4 At the start of the experiment all subjects have to
give their student ID number to the experimenter. The experimenter takes the sum of
all digits in each student’s ID number and the ones with the lowest sums receive the
highest outcomes. In case of two students having the same sum of digits, the lower
student ID number yields the higher outcome. For individual risk in the IDbased
Distribution we assume that the social planner imagines himself in the position of
the individuals, who do not know the sum of digits of the student ID numbers of the
other participants. For ex ante inequality the social planner takes into account the fact
that the ones with a high payoff are predetermined by personal characteristics.
At the end of the session we randomly chose one of the subjects to be the social
planner and randomly chose one of his questions to determine what the payoff of
every subject would be. In addition to these earnings all subjects receive e5.00 for
participating.
4.1 Subjects, payment, and procedures
We recruited 55 undergraduate students from Erasmus University Rotterdam (34
male, 21 female, 52 economics students) for 5 sessions of 11 subjects. All partici-
pants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each subject participated in only
one session. To ensure anonymity and avoid any communication during the exper-
iment, subjects were seated in sight-shielded cubicles. After being seated, subjects
received written instructions, which they could study at their own pace. They could
ask questions privately in case they needed clarification. The experiment did not start
before all subjects had correctly answered a series of comprehension questions. The
instructions and comprehension questions are in Online Appendix C.
The experiment was computerized using Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Every ques-
tion was displayed in a different screen, where one option was shown on the left-hand
side and the other on the right-hand side. We randomized the order of the questions
and the left/right position of the options. The experiment started with three practice
questions, where each of the five allocation types was an option at least once. The
allocation types in these practice questions were based on different basic lotteries
than the other questions of the experiment. At the end of the experiment subjects
were paid anonymously.
5 Results
The results of our experiment are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage we make
use of non-parametric tests. In the second stage we employ logit regressions to
4We wanted ex ante inequality to result from the mere fact that the allocation is based on personal char-
acteristics, while keeping these characteristics as neutral as possible so as not to arouse any additional
emotions. The sum of the digits in student ID numbers have the advantage that they are relatively random
and neutral characteristics of our subjects. We repeated the analyses in this paper excluding the IDbased
distribution and ex ante inequality. This did not affect our results: the signs and significance levels of the
coefficients in Table 6 were unaffected.
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Table 4 Data pooled by question type independently of basic lottery
Option A Option B A B p-value
1&11&21 Independent Lottery Random Distribution 73% 27% 0.000***
2&12&22 Independent Lottery IDbased Distribution 77% 23% 0.000***
3&13&23 Independent Lottery Common Lottery 58% 42% 0.043**
4&14&24 Independent Lottery Common Outcome 47% 53% 0.534
5&15&25 Random Distribution IDbased Distribution 68% 32% 0.000***
6&16&26 Random Distribution Common Lottery 39% 61% 0.008***
7&17&27 Random Distribution Common Outcome 36% 64% 0.001***
8&18&28 IDbased Distribution Common Lottery 36% 64% 0.001***
9&19&29 IDbased Distribution Common Outcome 35% 65% 0.000***
10&20&30 Common Lottery Common Outcome 44% 56% 0.119
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
further analyze the data. All tests reported in this section are two-sided, unless stated
differently.
5.1 Preferences over allocation types
Table 3 (fourth column) shows, for each question, the percentage of subjects choos-
ing Option A. This table thereby reveals the options that would be chosen under
majority voting by a team of social planners: the options that are preferred by more
than 50% of the subjects. If choices were completely random then the percentage of
subjects choosing Option A would be 50%, as the order in which the options are pre-
sented is randomized. The last column of the table gives the two-sided p-values of
binomial tests with assumed probability 50%. For each question a separate binomial
test was done. We repeated these binomial tests for data pooled by question type,
independently of the basic lottery, as summarized in Table 4. For instance, we com-
bined all choices between independent lotteries and random distributions, no matter
which underlying basic lottery, i.e. we combined questions 1, 11, and 21.
From the pooled data we conclude that, based on majority voting, subjects have
the following preferences over allocation types:
IndepLottery ∼ CommonOutcome  CommonLottery  RandomDistr  IDbasedDistr
where the strict preferences indicate significance at the 5% level.5 The weak prefer-
ence indicates weak significance with the common outcome weakly preferred to the
common lottery with a pooled p-value of 0.119.
5If subjects were to make their choices randomly, they would choose Option A with 50% probability in
each question, as in 50% of the cases Option A was shown on the left and in the other cases on the right
of the screen. Moreover, their choices would be completely independent between different questions, as
the left-right position on the screen was randomized for each question independently. Thus, every p-value
of the pooled data corresponds to a test of the hypothesis that subjects respond entirely randomly to one
type of question. This actually is a test of the joint hypothesis that subjects choose Option A with 50%
probability and that the responses to the same question type over different basic lotteries are independent.
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Table 5 Number of subjects with 0, 1, 2, 3, or at least 2 choices consistent with the pattern
Question type 0 1 2 3 ≥2
1&11&21 Independent Lottery vs. Random Distribution 4 10 13 28 41
2&12&22 Independent Lottery vs. IDbased Distribution 6 5 10 34 44
3&13&23 Independent Lottery vs. Common Lottery 13 10 10 22 32
4&14&24 Independent Lottery vs. Common Outcome 0 0 0 55 55
5&15&25 Random Distribution vs. IDbased Distribution 11 7 6 31 37
6&16&26 Random Distribution vs. Common Lottery 5 16 18 16 34
7&17&27 Random Distribution vs. Common Outcome 9 7 19 20 39
8&18&28 IDbased Distribution vs. Common Lottery 12 9 6 28 34
9&19&29 IDbased Distribution vs. Common Outcome 9 6 18 22 40
10&20&30 Common Lottery vs. Common Outcome 7 16 19 13 32
When looking at the data per question, we see that the independent lottery is pre-
ferred over the common lottery, but not significantly. Yet, the pooled data show a
significant difference. The common outcome is significantly preferred over the com-
mon lottery only for the basic lottery (30% : 4, 7% : 9). For the remaining questions,
a few significance levels are lower than in the pooled data, but there are no strong
contradictions of the abovementioned preference pattern.
To test for consistency with the abovementioned pattern within subjects, we com-
puted the number of times a subject chose consistently with it for each question
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Fig. 1 Summary of consistency with the general pattern
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type. The results of this consistency-check are in Table 5, where we show the
number of subjects who are consistent with the general pattern in 0, 1, 2, or 3
choices per question type. We see that for each question type substantially more
than 50% of the subjects are consistent with the pattern in a majority of their
choices (in at least 2 choices), which supports consistency within subjects. At the
same time we also see that for some question types there is a substantial pro-
portion of subjects (between 10% and 25%) who are always consistent with the
opposite of the pattern for this question type, which shows that there is hetero-
geneity between subjects. Therefore, the results reported in this paper should be
interpreted as reflecting majority preferences of a heterogeneous group of decision
makers.
Table 5 illustrates the within-subject-consistency for each question type separately.
For every subject we also counted the total number of choices (out of the 30 possible
choices) that are in line with the general pattern described above. These counts are
summarized in Fig. 1. A binomial test shows that significantly more than 50% of the
subjects (37 out of 55) are consistent with this pattern in at least two-thirds of their
choices (p-value = 0.003).6
The results so far are consistent with the findings of Keller and Sarin (1988);
Bian and Keller (1999), who conducted surveys asking people to choose between
some of our allocation types in health and safety contexts with binary outcomes
(alive or dead). Robson (1996) provides an evolutionary basis for the indepen-
dent lottery being preferred over the common lottery. Kroll and Davidovitz (2003),
however, found that 8-year-old children prefer a common lottery to the corre-
sponding independent lottery. Loomes (1982) found a lot of heterogeneity between
people’s preferences. Yet, Loomes (1982) and Kroll and Davidovitz (2003) con-
sidered decision makers who were included in the group of people affected
by the decisions, and thereby did not rule out selfish motives. Thus, any dif-
ference between these two studies and ours may at least partly be caused by
selfish motives.
5.1.1 Interpretation of the results in terms of attitudes towards inequality and risk
Our subjects are clearly not indifferent between all allocation types. The social plan-
ner with a utilitarian welfare function and individual self-regarding utilities as inputs
is thereby rejected by our data.
For further interpretation of the results we assume that decision makers have con-
sistent preferences in the sense that if they are averse (seeking or neutral) to a risk or
inequality concept in one question, they are so in all questions.
The preference for the Random Distribution over the IDbased Distribution is
highly significant. Looking at Table 2 we see that the only difference between these
two allocation types is the ex ante inequality. Thus, we can conclude that subjects are
ex ante inequality averse.
6Twenty-one of them are male and 16 female.
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The Common Lottery and the Random Distribution differ in only two
respects: Common Lottery has a higher collective risk and Random Distribu-
tion has a higher expected ex post inequality. The preference for the Com-
mon Lottery over the Random Distribution is therefore consistent with only
two combinations of attitudes towards expected ex post inequality and collective
risk:
• expected ex post inequality averse & collective risk averse, neutral, or seeking
• expected ex post inequality seeking or neutral & collective risk seeking.
The Independent Lottery differs from the Common Lottery also in two respects:
the Independent Lottery has a higher expected ex post inequality and the Common
Lottery has a higher collective risk. The preference for the Independent Lottery over
the Common Lottery is therefore consistent with only two combinations of attitudes
towards expected ex post inequality and collective risk:
• expected ex post inequality averse or neutral & collective risk averse
• expected ex post inequality seeking & collective risk averse, neutral, or seeking.
The Common Outcome and the Random Distribution also differ in only two
respects: the Random Distribution has both a higher expected ex post inequality
and a higher individual risk than the Common Outcome. From the preference for
the Common Outcome over the Random Distribution we can therefore conclude
that subjects cannot be both expected ex post inequality seeking and individual risk
seeking. Similarly, from the preference for the Common Outcome over the Com-
mon Lottery we can conclude that subjects cannot be both individual risk seeking
and collective risk seeking. Finally, from the indifference between the Independent
Lottery and the Common Outcome we can conclude that people must be expected
ex post inequality seeking/neutral, individual risk seeking/neutral, or collective risk
seeking/neutral.
To summarize, of the 34 = 81 theoretically possible combinations of inequality
and risk attitudes, two are consistent with the findings:
(I) ex ante inequality averse - ex post inequality averse - individual risk seeking -
collective risk averse
(II) ex ante inequality averse - ex post inequality seeking - individual risk averse -
collective risk seeking
These two patterns imply that subjects are not neutral to any of the risk and
inequality concepts we consider. They therefore do not process risks and inequalities
purely sequentially.
5.2 Relative importance of risk and inequality
In order to determine which of the two combinations of attitudes towards inequalities
and risks is most consistent with the data, we employ a logit estimation. For every
allocation type j we let antej , postj , indj , and collj denote its ex ante inequal-
ity, expected ex post inequality, individual risk, and collective risk, respectively. We
assume that the evaluation of an allocation type is based on a weighted sum of
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Table 6 Logit estimations
Motive Coefficient p-value
Ex ante inequality (γante) −0.324 0.050**
Ex post inequality (γpost ) 0.680 0.000***
Individual risk (γind ) −1.157 0.000***
Collective Risk (γcoll) 0.357 0.000***
Ex ante inequality −0.651 0.000***
Ex post inequality −0.295 0.004***
Individual risk −0.326 0.012**
Collective Risk 0.133 0.000***
Ex ante inequality −0.604 0.000***
Ex post inequality −0.093 0.368
Individual risk −0.573 0.000***
Collective Risk 0.217 0.000***
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
the (dis)utility generated by each motive, where we assume diminishing sensitivity,
i.e. the value of allocation j for individual i is given by7
Vi,j = γante ln(1 + antej ) + γpost ln(1 + postj )
+γind ln(1 + indj ) + γcoll ln(1 + collj ) + εi,j ,
where εi,j is an individual-specific error term. The probability that an individ-
ual chooses allocation j when he is offered the choice between allocation j and
allocation k, is given by
P(Vi,j > Vi,k) = exp(Vi,j − Vi,k)
1 + exp(Vi,j − Vi,k) .
We estimate the coefficients γante, γpost , γind , and γcoll, by using robust vari-
ance estimators clustered by subject. Thereby we correct for possible differences in
behavior between subjects and interdependencies in choices within subjects.
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients and their p-values. Rows 2 till 5 of the
table show that all motives play a highly significant role. The coefficients show that
7The natural logarithm implies diminishing sensitivity, i.e. decreasing marginal impacts of inequalities and
risks. For instance, the more ex ante inequality, the less impact an increase in ex ante inequality will have.
The marginal impact of each inequality or risk variable is unaffected by the levels of the other variables.
We add a constant 1 to each variable before taking the natural logarithm in order to ensure that if a variable
takes on a zero value, its effect on the evaluation is zero as well: ln(1+ 0) = 0. In terms of implied choice
behavior the value function we use is equivalent to the function
Vi,j = (1 + antej )γante (1 + postj )γpost (1 + indj )γind (1 + collj )γcoll eεi,j .
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people are ex ante inequality averse, ex post inequality seeking, individual risk averse,
and collective risk seeking. One may wonder whether the high significance levels
may be due to the fact that we assume the responses to different questions to be
independent, whereas this independence may be violated if subjects make transitive
choices. Therefore, we also ran the same regression including only the responses to
questions 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, and 30. Qualitatively, the results of
this regression are the same as for the regression with all data: same attitudes towards
the motives and equally high significance levels (10%, 5%, or 1%).
To further assess the robustness of our results, we also estimated a mixture model
where every individual is of one of two types, the results of which are reported
in Online Appendix B. The two types of individuals may have different prefer-
ences. We expected that the two types would be consistent with patterns (I) and
(II) of Section 5.1, respectively. Yet, this turned out not to be the case: with a
66% probability a subject was in line with the results of our logit estimation and
otherwise he had preferences that deviate from both (I) and (II), being ex ante
inequality and collective risk seeking and ex post inequality and individual risk
neutral.
At first sight it is counterintuitive and thereby surprising to see that people are ex
post inequality seeking and collective risk seeking. Studies on inequality in riskless
contexts, for instance involving dictator and ultimatum games, suggest that people
are inequality averse, which seems to contradict ex post inequality seeking. Yet there
need not be a contradiction: one has to realize that in a riskless setting, ex ante and
ex post inequality coincide. Therefore, in riskless contexts we cannot disentangle
the two inequality concepts. Moreover, our experiment only considers inequalities
generated by different distributions of risks over subjects, given an equal distribution
of individual expected utilities.
One motive which possibly underlies ex post inequality and collective risk seeking
is responsibility aversion (Leonhardt et al. 2011). This motive refers to a preference
of people to minimize their causal role in determining final outcomes. Responsibility
averse people prefer to transfer responsibility to “nature”, thereby having a tendency
to like risky options where nature determines the final outcome.
By having a closer look at expected ex post inequality and collective risk our
findings can be reconciled with intuition as follows. Keeney (1980a) and Ben-Porath
et al. (1997) showed that collective risk seeking is closely related to ex post inequality
aversion. They show that when omitting collective risk, collective risk seeking is
translated into ex post inequality aversion, as we saw in the comparison between
Procedures II and III in Section 2. Thus, when not properly accounting for collective
risk, the usual finding of ex post inequality aversion could, theoretically, be the net
result of a combination of two pure attitudes: pure ex post inequality seeking and
pure collective risk seeking. In order to investigate whether this is the case for our
data, we also ran logit regressions with only one motive at a time.
The results are reported in rows 6 till 9 of Table 6. There we see that if we only
focus on ex ante inequality, we find significant aversion, which is in line with our pre-
vious estimation. Similarly, we find individual risk aversion if we isolate that motive.
We find collective risk seeking, which is also in line with previous estimations. Yet,
when only incorporating ex post inequality, we find significant ex post inequality
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aversion. Thus, if we do not properly account for collective risk, collective risk seek-
ing is translated into ex post inequality aversion, resulting in a net effect of ex post
inequality aversion when combined with pure ex post inequality seeking. This is an
interesting result, which shows that inequality is a complex concept that should be
interpreted with care. It suggests that the common ex post inequality aversion may
partly be driven by concerns for collective risk. The results are in line with Engel-
mann and Strobel (2004) who, in a riskless setting, also found that inequality aversion
was driven by other basic concerns such as maximin preferences.
Finally, we ran logit regressions including only the inequality measures (rows 10-
11 of Table 6) and only the risk measures (rows 12-13 of Table 6). There we see
insignificant ex post inequality aversion, in line with the above mentioned results.
Many studies on individual risk attitudes show that women are more risk averse
than men (Eckel and Grossman 2008). In order to analyze whether there is a gender
effect in our analysis, we repeated all logit regressions, now including the relevant
variables multiplied by a dummy variable being 1 for males and 0 for females.
The estimates for this regression are given in Table 7. Men and women have sim-
ilar and significant attitudes towards risks and inequalities. There are differences
between men and women, though, in the levels of their attitudes. Men are signifi-
cantly less ex post inequality and collective risk seeking than women. Moreover, men
are significantly less individual risk averse than women.
6 Discussion
This paper investigated decision makers’ preferences over distributions of risks that
do not affect their own payoffs. Such decisions are made, for example, by govern-
ments allocating resources to groups in society, by health-policy makers deciding
whom to vaccinate, by managers allocating resources over their employees, and by
insurance companies deciding which risks to insure. Since the decision makers we
consider obtain payoffs that are independent of their decisions, we call them impartial
spectators, or social planners.
Table 7 Logit estimations including gender
Motive Coefficient p-value
Ex ante inequality (γante) −0.103 0.680
Ex ante inequality men (γante × man) −0.358 0.280
Ex post inequality (γpost ) 1.127 0.000***
Ex post inequality men (γpost × man) −0.710 0.048**
Individual risk (γind ) −1.778 0.000***
Individual risk men (γind × man) 0.987 0.032**
Collective Risk (γcoll) 0.542 0.000***
Collective Risk men (γcoll × man) −0.293 0.017**
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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We made several choices when designing the experiment, in order to mimic deci-
sion situations that social planners may face in reality. First of all, we wanted to keep
the salience of the payoffs of the decision makers as low as possible. To this end we
fixed the payoffs of decision makers at e7.50 and only considered allocations that
have an expected payoff per person equal to the payoff of the decision maker. We
also referred to the payoff of the decision maker only in the instructions and did not
display them further in the experiment.8 In line with this low salience of decision
makers’ own payoffs, we used inequality measures based only on the dispersion of
payoffs between individuals other than the decision maker.
An interesting avenue for future research is to analyze decision situations where
the payoffs of the decision makers are more salient and to employ dispersion mea-
sures that include the decision maker in the group of interest. One can also consider
situations where the decision maker is always better or always worse off than every
individual in the group he decides for. It will also be interesting to consider situations
where the decision maker is part of the group for which he decides, either with or
without a veil of ignorance. This will reveal whether and how decisions concerning
public risks change when decision makers are influenced by their own decisions.
Moreover, our analysis focussed on the decisions made by social planners without
analyzing the well-being of the people affected by the chosen allocations of risk. As
impartial spectators may want to choose allocations of risks that maximize the well-
being of the group they are deciding for, it will also be important for future studies
to analyze the degree of satisfaction of this group with the allocations chosen by the
impartial spectators.
We also recommend further experiments to analyze a wider variety of allocations
with different basic lotteries. It will be of interest to analyze whether our results
are robust to a change in the difference between the lowest and highest payoff, to a
change in the expected values of the basic lotteries, and to an extension to the domain
of losses. A further extension is to allow subjects to express indifference.
As mentioned before, our study is closely related to theoretical and empiri-
cal studies on public and social risk (Fishburn and Sarin 1991; Keeney 1980a, b;
Keeney and Winkler 1985; Sarin 1985; Gajdos et al. 2010). These studies differ from
ours in the sense that they consider two possible outcomes for individuals, whereas
we consider a wider range of possible outcomes, having a continuum of possible out-
comes in mind. The measures of dispersion that we use are therefore also different
from theirs. An important adjustment we made is that our measures are also sensitive
to the exact difference between the highest and lowest payoffs in a group of peo-
ple. As we wanted our measures to depend on this difference, we also decided not to
use the measures introduced by Fishburn and Sarin (1994, 1997). Fishburn and Sarin
(1994, 1997) consider benefits and risks (costs) to groups of people without restrict-
ing them to be binary. Their measures of fairness take into account that higher
benefits are preferred to lower ones. Yet, they are based on the number of people
that a person envies and thereby do not depend on the exact difference between the
highest and lowest payoffs. Future experiments, which vary the difference between
8This is an important difference between our study and the one by Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
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the highest and lowest payoff in society, can be used to test which measures describe
impartial spectators’ preferences best.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzed social planners’ attitudes towards public risks through an exper-
iment. Public risks entail two types of dispersions in outcomes: dispersions within
individuals, risks, and dispersions between individuals, inequalities. We analyzed
people’s preferences over public risks that differ only in terms of these dispersions.
The experimental setup also allowed us to disentangle attitudes towards ex ante
inequality, ex post inequality, individual risk, and collective risk.
In the experiment with real incentives subjects chose between allocations of risks
over 10 other subjects. Subjects were impartial spectators in the sense that their
decisions could not affect their own payoffs. Our main result is that subjects had
clear preferences over the allocation types which differed only in terms of risk and
inequality. This rules out the possibility for these social planners to maximize a
utilitarian welfare function with individual self-regarding utilities as inputs.
The results also show that our subjects are ex ante inequality and individual risk
averse and ex post inequality and collective risk seeking. While we expected to find
ex ante inequality aversion and individual risk aversion, ex post inequality seeking
and collective risk seeking were surprising at first sight. Yet, a closer look at collec-
tive risk and ex post inequality helps to understand this result. These two concepts
are closely related and intuitively hard to disentangle. The literature on public risk
has shown that a collective risk seeking attitude translates into an ex post inequal-
ity averse attitude when not properly accounted for. This suggests that one’s intuitive
expectation of ex post inequality aversion might in fact be confounded with collective
risk seeking. Responsibility aversion possibly underlies a tendency to be collective
risk and ex post inequality seeking.
Our findings provide useful insights for public risk management. Think of a choice
between two technologies to reduce risks—for instance two vaccines for a conta-
gious disease. One vaccine works moderately well for everybody, reducing the risk
of getting the disease partially, but equally, for everybody. The other vaccine entirely
eliminates the risk of getting the disease for some people and has no effect for others.
The first vaccine can be viewed as an independent lottery and the second as a random
lottery. Hence, our experiment implies a preference for the first vaccine.
Though one should be careful in drawing general conclusions from single exper-
iments, one general conclusion can be drawn from this study: decision makers who
have to (re)distribute resources over groups of people will not merely pay attention to
inequalities in expected outcomes, but also to inequalities in risks. In particular, they
will pay attention to ex ante and ex post inequality and to individual and collective
risk. Disregarding any of these criteria may lead to suboptimal decisions.
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